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MODERNITY AND THE LAW: 
A LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY VIEW 
 
ROBERT P. BURNS*
 
 
I intend here to explore Roberto Unger’s understanding of the particular 
situation modernity presents for the law. Unger sets his account of modern law 
within a broad historical and philosophical context that will help us explore in 
detail the significance of important developments in our procedural law that 
have occurred in the forty years since he did the work on which I am focusing.1 
He built his account of the relationship between law and modernity around a 
number of distinctions. One set of distinctions is among customary law, 
bureaucratic law,2 and the “rule of law ideal” that emerged with the modern 
European liberal society and which survives in a modified form through our 
“postliberal” contemporary world.3 “In the broadest sense law is simply any 
recurring mode of interaction among individuals and groups, together with the 
more or less explicit acknowledgment” of the legitimacy of the reciprocal 
expectations that these interactions occasion.4 If law does not go beyond this, it 
is what Unger calls “customary or interactional law” which combines factual 
regularity with a “sentiment of obligation and entitlement” that identifies 
“established forms of conduct with the idea of a right order in society and in the 
world at large.”5 Though dominant in premodern societies, customary law 
persists as a background to the other forms of legality in various ways, 
controlling areas that more explicit law does not reach and sometimes offering 
substantive standards, such as the various “reasonable man” notions. Custom 
obviously “lacks the attribute of positiveness: it is made up of implicit standards 
of conduct rather than of formulated rules” and tends to apply narrowly rather 
than “to very general classes.” It also resists being “reduced to a set of rules; to 
codify them is to change them.”6    
Beyond customary law, there is “bureaucratic or regulatory law” which is 
public and positive and arises only “in situations in which the division between 
state and society has been established and some standards of conduct have 
assumed the form of explicit prescriptions, prohibitions, or permissions 
 
 
 
* William W. Gurley Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. 
1 The next step would be to link Unger’s account of law with other, more comprehensive 
understandings of modernity, such as Charles Taylor’s. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: 
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989). Unger’s thought has, of course, continued to develop 
in the intervening decades. I have been critical of some of those developments. See Robert P. Burns, When 
the Owl of Minerva Takes Flight at Dawn: Radical Constructivism in Social Theory, in CRITIQUE AND 
CONSTRUCTION: ESSAYS ON A SYMPOSIUM ON UNGER’S POLITICS (Robin Lovin & Michael Perry, eds., 
1990). 
2 Perhaps “bureaucratic rule” would be more accurate, in that he includes with “bureaucratic law” 
rule by specific decrees and orders as well as through rules. For Unger’s earlier treatment of bureaucratic 
order, see ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 170-74 (1975).  
3 Id. 
4 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARDS A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL 
THEORY 49 (1976) [hereinafter LMS]. 
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 50.  
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addressed to more or less general categories of persons and acts.”7 It is 
“deliberately imposed by government rather than spontaneously produced by 
society.”8 Here, the state appears at least nominally to define the relative powers 
of groups in a subordinated society, though one or more of those groups may 
actually dominate the state itself. This law is bureaucratic in that it “belongs 
peculiarly to the province of centralized rulers and their specialized staffs.”9 It 
is the medium through which the will of the sovereign, originally princely but 
then in some places democratic, can be enforced.10 Bureaucratic law has always 
been at least somewhat limited by custom and sometimes by bodies of sacred 
law presided over by priestly castes.11 The state becomes essential once 
conflicting social groups appear, though it harbors a central paradox: 
 
Only an entity that somehow stands above the conflicting 
groups can both limit the power of all the groups and pretend to 
the posture of impartiality, impersonality, to providential 
harmony which sanctions its claim to their allegiance. The state, 
which is the child of the social hierarchy, must also be its ruler; 
it must be distinct from any one social group in the system of 
domination and dependence. Yet it has to draw its staff and its 
purposes from groups that are part of this system. Whenever 
either side of the paradox is forgotten, the true relationship 
between state and society is forgotten, the true relationship 
between state and society is obscured.12 
 
A condition for the emergence of bureaucratic law is what Unger calls “the 
disintegration of community[,]” by which he means only that some important 
number of its members feel “increasingly able to question the rightness of 
accepted practices as well as to violate them[,]” a condition that inheres in all 
concretely imaginable non-voluntary modern communities.13  
Bureaucratic law is “the device by which the state manipulates social 
relations” and “a tool of the power interests of the group that control the state.”14 
 
 
 
7 Id. at 51. 
8 Id.  
9 Id. See also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 88–102 (3rd ed. 2007) (emphasizing, in a way 
that Unger does not, the centrality of the applied social sciences to the contemporary bureaucrat’s claim 
to authority). See also JASON BLAKELY, ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, CHARLES TAYLOR, AND THE DEMISE 
OF NATURALISM 15–20 (2016) (describing how the nature of that claimed expertise changed as the 
bureaucracy ceased to claim to speak for a unified national identity and presented itself as mediating 
among self-interested groups).  
10 See ROBERT P. BURNS, KAFKA’S LAW: THE TRIAL AND AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 65–71 
(2014) (The mass democratic exercise of sovereignty need not always be more benign.); id. at 65–71. See 
also JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2009). 
11 The distinction between the prince’s bureaucratic law and a sacred space that he cannot with 
impunity invade is as old as Sophocles’ Antigone. 
12 LMS, supra note 4, at 60–61 (linking the need for bureaucratic law with greater divisions of labor 
and social stratification in more developed societies that raise the level of conscious “apartness” from 
others). Id. at 63–64.  
13 Id. at 58. 
14 Id. at 64, 158 (Bureaucratic law has often coexisted with some realm of “sacred, super positive 
order.”). Id. at 158. 
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As such, it is likely to be viewed in purely instrumental terms. But its legitimacy 
often depended on satisfying “the need of rulers and the governed alike to justify 
the structure of society by relating it to an image of social and cosmic order” 
rather than simply relying on the terror with which the order is imposed.15 If it 
is simply the tool of the holders of state power, it can be changed whenever the 
rulers choose.16 If not, it gains permanence, but loses some of its flexible 
instrumental character. This form of law contains tensions that will lead to the 
emergence of yet another form of law, the modern European rule of law ideal.   
The modern rule of law ideal will turn out to have significant discontinuities 
with the bureaucratic order, but important continuities as well. It emerges in 
stages. Its precondition is a “liberal society,” a pluralist or interest group social 
order. No one group dominates or can plausibly claim an inherent right to rule 
or be accepted as the natural order of things. In a bureaucracy, rules are useful 
simply “as a generality of political experience,” to allow the higher bureaucrats 
to control the behavior of their subordinates.17 “[T]here are no commitments to 
generality in lawmaking and to uniformity in adjudication that must be kept 
regardless of the political interests of the rulers.”18 A liberal society thus cries 
out for a legal order: 
 
This way of organizing and perceiving society has 
revolutionary implications for law. Liberal society cannot 
resolve its problem of social order through the mere imposition 
of bureaucratic law; it is a form of life in which no one group is 
able to command for long the loyalty and the obedience of all 
other groups. Thus, it becomes important to devise a system of 
law whose content somehow accommodates antagonistic 
interests and whose procedures are such that most everyone 
might find it in his own interest to subscribe to them regardless 
of the ends he happens to seek.19 
 
The opposing tensions can lead to the “creation of a legal order with the 
attributes of generality and autonomy.”20 Rules and procedure can then claim 
 
 
 
15 Id. at 65.  
16 The apex of this kind of instability actually occurred during the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth 
century. There, “all laws have become laws of movement” as “decree followed decree” and all stability 
disappeared. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 463 (New Edition with Added 
Prefaces, 1973) (The apex of this kind of instability actually occurred during the totalitarian regimes of 
the twentieth century.). See also DAVID GRAEBER, THE UTOPIA OF RULES: ON TECHNOLOGY, STUPIDITY 
AND THE SECRET JOYS OF BUREAUCRACY 195 (2015) (“Even on the lowest levels, those who enforce 
the law are not really subject to it. It’s extraordinary [sic] difficult, for instance, for a police officer to do 
anything to an American citizen that would lead to that officer’s being convicted of a crime.”).  
17 Id. 
18 LMS, supra note 4, at 67. 
19 Id. at 69. This system will be pulled in opposing directions. Those pleased with the status quo will 
want it preserved, while those less advantaged may see in the legal order an opportunity to oppose the 
social status quo or the exercise of bureaucratic power. This descriptive formulation parallels Rawls’ 
normative liberal account of the distribution of primary goods, scarce goods everyone wants regardless 
of what else they want, behind a veil of ignorance as to their ultimate position in society. See also JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 90–95 (1971). (Of course, the creation of the institutions that support the 
rule of law did not occur behind a veil of ignorance). 
20 Id. 
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“to represent, over the long run, that universal interest which consists in the 
accommodation of all particular interests.”21 The interpretation of these laws by 
specialized institutions, staffed by a relatively independent professional group, 
steeped in its own craft and techniques of argument seems to ensure that those 
the legal order seeks to control will not use it as a tool to pursue their own private 
interests. Though the prince and the bureaucracy begin on the same side (though 
can come to have divergent interests), both may view the independent legal order 
with suspicion. And so, the legal order has been historically rare. For example, 
merchant groups throughout Europe preferred their own rules and tribunals. 
“Only in modern Europe did the breakthrough occur that made it possible to fuse 
the two bodies of law,” the merchants’ rule and the bureaucratic law of the state, 
“into a legal order that is different from both its parents.”22   
The rule of law emerged, then, from a compromise among “monarchic 
bureaucracy, aristocratic privilege, and middle class interest.” No one group was 
wholly pleased with it: 
 
Rulers had to sacrifice a parcel of their discretion and the 
aristocracies and the third estates a measure of their desired 
independence from government. Through this reciprocal 
conciliation and surrender, the legal order was born. When we 
study the events that produced legal systems in Europe—the 
struggles between courts and ministries, between juristic 
technique and remorseless statecraft, between efforts to submit 
government to society or to subject the latter to the former—we 
encounter the signs and stages of this process. For all parties 
concerned, the rule of law, like life insurance and like 
liberalism itself, was an attempt to make the best of a bad 
situation.23 
 
Unger argues as well that some vague notion of natural law was important 
for the emergence of the rule of law ideal in early modernity. Like customary 
law, natural law merged fact and value and was not a creature of human 
deliberation, but it differed from custom “in the generality of its formulation, in 
the universality of its alleged scope of application, and in the scholarly or 
religious character of the authority upon which it is based.”24 The natural law 
notion supports the idea that law “ought to have a measure of critical 
independence from politics and custom” and so “requires specialized 
institutions, occupational groups, and modes of discourse.”25 It also gave rise to 
 
 
 
21 LMS, supra note 4, at 69–70. 
22 Id. at 74. See also Emily Kadens, The Medieval Law Merchant: The Tyranny of a Construct, 7 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 251 (2015) (disputing the existence of a merchants’ law truly independent from the 
state). 
23 Id. at 75–76 (emphasis added). 
24 Id. at 76. See also Alasdair MacIntyre, Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues, and 
Goods, in THE MACINTYRE READER, 136–152 (Kelvin Knight ed. 1998) (MacIntyre emphasizes the 
continuity between at least Aristotelian-Thomistic natural law and the “intuitive” judgments of ordinary 
people.). 
25 LMS, supra note 4, at 80. See also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW” BACKGROUND OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008).  
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the essentially contested26 notion of equality before the law: “[o]nly in the 
modern West did a system of law develop that assigned duties and entitlements 
to individuals regardless of their social rank.”27 The importance of the natural 
law notion to the emergence of the modern rule of law creates a central issue for 
contemporary societies: “[c]an the ideals of autonomy and generality in law 
survive the demise of the religious beliefs that presided over their birth?”28 And 
is an autonomous legal order, committed to some notion of generality, or 
equality before the law, a mere “transitory characteristic” of societies where the 
divine and the political orders are separated?29 These are not wholly speculative 
questions. 
It was, then, the unique and fortuitous combination of natural law ideas and 
a liberal social order that created the notion of a legal order reflecting the rule of 
law. The former initially suggested the merger of moral or religious ideas and 
the legal world, not, however, the autonomy of the latter from the former. A 
purely liberal ideal, however, suggests resolving individual problematic 
situations either by ad hoc bargaining or bureaucratic pressure unrestrained by 
the formalities that may protect the interests of those out of power. The modern 
notions of natural right and the related theory of “public natural law”30 conceded 
the existence of norms superior to state power, but reflected modern pluralism 
by conceiving of “natural rights as powers of the individual to act within a sphere 
of absolute discretion.”31 The synthesis would come under pressure because of 
the inherent tensions within it. The natural law background suggested 
inalienable and legally protected rights resistant to any claim of expedience, 
while the pluralist and interest group background suggested balancing and an 
ideal of law reflecting the flexibility and the usual devotion of bureaucratic 
ordering to efficiency.32 This is the institutional version of the tension between 
 
 
 
26 LMS, supra note 4, at 81 (That equality could remain an abstract equality of equal treatment or 
give rise to a demand for substantive equality, which would, in turn, require that “one would have to treat 
people who are in different situations differently.” Id. at 81. In the liberal West, the former interpretation 
obviously dominated.).  
27 Id. at 85.  
28 Id. at 83. See also TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 519–21 (Charles Taylor tends to doubt that some of 
the aspects of modernity that had Christian origins can survive the loss of the religious foundation.). See 
also HANNAH ARENDT, HANNAH ARENDT: THE RECOVERY OF THE PUBLIC WORLD 313–14 (1979). 
Hannah Arendt was even more direct in her claim that whole “totalitarian catastrophe would not have 
happened if people had still believed in god, or in hell rather—that is if there still were ultimates.” Her 
general project was, however, to see many important public institutions as self-grounding, not needing a 
transcendent foundation. 
29 LMS, supra note 4, at 83. 
30 Unger cites LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1950), who sharply distinguishes 
modern natural right from classic natural right.  
31 LMS, supra note 4, at 85. See also TAYLOR, supra note 1 (This is similar to Taylor’s view of the 
distinctiveness of modern natural right compared to classic conceptions of natural law which broadly 
imposed obligations rather than underwriting permissions for discretionary action. Unger mentions that 
this coheres nicely with a view of the legal order as a system of conflict resolution.). 
32 This issue arises in the context of the theory of procedure, perhaps most commonly in debates 
surrounding the appropriateness of class actions. Some scholars argue that there are certain procedural 
rights of such transcendent significance, usually the right to control the direction of the litigation or to be 
heard individually, that they can never be balanced against the practical efficiency of the procedural 
device to provide at least some redress. For a critique of those views, see Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to 
Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U.L. REV. 485 
(2003). 
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Kantian notions of right and utilitarian balancing that still characterizes 
academic philosophy and public moral argumentation in the United States.  
Lon Fuller famously expanded what he understood as the rule of law ideal 
to include nine canons that constituted the inner morality of law. These were 
generality, publicity, clarity, consistency, feasibility, constancy,33 
prospectivity,34 and congruence.35 Fuller made a number of controversial claims 
about his canons. The term “inner morality” implied that these were moral rather 
than, or in addition to, analytical requirements. He made the related claims that 
these features of enactments were “constitutive rules,” so that without observing 
the canons, provisions would not be law at all and that they thus constituted 
“procedural natural law,” controlling legislation and administration.36 Finally, 
he made the claim, which goes considerably beyond Unger’s genetic account, 
that law so understood will “enhance human dignity.”37 David Luban concludes 
that the rule of law ideal certainly does not wholly prevent oppressive 
government, but that it “does deprive governments of some of their favorite 
devices of intimidation, namely, vague laws, secret laws, retroactive law, and 
confusing and inconsistent laws, all of which are used to keep citizens cautious 
and fearful.”38 Fuller’s argument, however, goes beyond this.  
Fuller distinguishes, as Unger does, between law and what Fuller calls 
“managerial directives,”39 which are basically orders directed to a specific 
person requiring or prohibiting a specific act. Of course, any functioning 
contemporary legal order will employ both, as bureaucratic rule always did, and 
the relationships between them can be enormously complex. Yet, Fuller 
maintains “governance through general rules by itself implies ‘a certain built-in 
respect for human dignity’ that managerial direction presumably lacks.”40 He 
argues that laws, however coercive, do not directly order men to do anything. 
Rather they recognize that a person is a “self-determining agent,” for whom law 
provides “baselines” that he can then integrate into his decisions.41 General rules 
cannot, without infinite regress, provide rules for their own application and they 
cannot identify all possible exception prior to their application. The citizen 
himself must then interpret the rule as a member of the same community to 
which the legislators belong. It is the background understandings of that 
community, what Fuller calls “implicit law,” that provide the range of plausible 
 
 
 
33 By “constancy,” Fuller meant resistance to rapid change. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 
(1969) [hereinafter Lon 1964]. 
34 Prospectivity would exclude ex post facto laws. Id. 
35 This requires a close relationship between the law as originally stated and as applied. See David 
Luban, The Rule of Law and Human Dignity, 2 HAGUE J. RULE L. 29 (2010); DAVID LUBAN, Natural 
Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 99–130 (2007). 
36 For a critical assessment by a prominent legal positivist, see Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its 
Virtue, 95 L. Q. REV. (1977).  
37 Id. at 3. Unger seems to concede that the rule of law does protect human freedom in many contexts, 
though especially by protecting individuals and groups against state power. Luban concludes that “the 
conception of human dignity at work in Fuller’s claims is too thin to be accepted.” Id. at 4. In particular, 
Luban concludes that Fuller has too libertarian a notion of the relationship of the law to the citizen and, 
in the terms I am using here, too small a place of the benign place of bureaucratic law in contemporary 
society.  
38 Id. at 10.  
39 Lon 1964, supra note 33, at 207.  
40 Luban, supra note 35, at 12. 
41 Id.  
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interpretations for any rule. And the rule of law ideal trusts citizens to execute 
their own rational life plan into which they integrate the requirements of the 
law.42 Luban concludes, however, as does Unger, that the “rule of law as a law 
of rules” manifests only a weak form of respect for the person. This 
conceptualization is compatible with “social relationships marked by radical 
subordination of one person by another,” and “[p]rivate oppression, domestic 
violence, workplace exploitation, and radical inequality are evils that legal 
autonomy will not cure.”43 Bureaucracy, what Luban calls “state intrusion,” can 
“protect people as well as oppress people, and decent states will intervene to 
establish the conditions in which people can live in dignity . . .”44  
 Because of its centrality to modernity’s self-understanding, Unger tells us, 
“[t]he transformations of law provide a viewpoint from which to survey the 
panorama of modernity[.]”45 In liberal society, “every individual belongs to a 
large number of significant groups, but each of these groups affects only a 
limited part of his life.”46 The whole person is never manifested in any one 
context. Because individuals interact in impersonal contexts like markets and 
bureaucracy, formal equality and impersonal respect replace tribal solidarity, 
though never completely. Perceived mutual advantage eventually replaces a 
common vision of the good: “As interest association replaces community 
solidarity, the basis for seeing social arrangements as expressions of the good, 
the beautiful, or the holy collapses” and “the main puzzle of social thought [is] 
that order can prevail despite this diversity.”47                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Until the rise of a liberal order, the prince’s commands could be addressed 
to a single person or to the entire realm; the modern distinction between 
legislation and administration was nonexistent. Generality was an accidental 
characteristic, rather than an essential requirement of law. Likewise, in pre-
modern Europe, the contrast between administration and adjudication hardly 
existed. This distinction, which assigned to adjudication distinct institutions, 
methods of discourse, and occupational groups, was designed to “protect the 
authoritative interpretation of law, as a sphere of rule-determined decisions, 
from politics, as a realm of prudential judgments.”48 As princely power grew, 
 
 
 
42 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Rawls counts the ability to have a 
rational life plan, along with the ability to subject one’s behavior to moral norms, as one of the elements 
of personhood.  
43 Luban, supra note 35, at 13. 
44 Id. Luban notes the importance of lawyers in blunting bureaucratic state power (for good or for ill) 
and in many contexts creating (private) law. Fuller is unique among legal philosophers in making lawyers 
central players in the legal order. He concludes that he fails to appreciate sufficiently lawyers’ role in 
counseling compliance with the law where state enforcement cannot be universal and the importance of 
distribution of legal services. And he notes the tension between the independence that a market-based 
legal profession has and a fair distribution of legal services. 
45 LMS, supra note 4, at 136. 
46 Id. at 143. 
47 Id. at 146. 
48 Id. at 161. In the early modern period, the central bureaucratic power was limited not by the 
generality of rules, but by the privileges of the estates. The law governing estate privileges had only “the 
beginnings of a commitment to generality and autonomy,” but not to formal equality or specialized legal 
institutions. The law of the estates provided only the germ of the notion of a fundamental law preceding 
politics and limiting bureaucratic power. The French revolution’s assertion of “omnipotent popular 
sovereignty introduced a rival tradition of constitutionalism.” Id. at 164. For the American version of 
popular sovereignty, see GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1789 
(1971). The American version always stood in tension with the “higher law” background to constitutional 
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the aristocracy and the third estate remained sufficiently powerful to insist that 
it be subject to preexistent laws, “addressed to broadly defined categories of 
persons and acts.”49 This development led to the establishment of an independent 
judiciary “to oversee the administrative use of legislation,” as Unger strikingly 
described it, in a manner detailing the vision embedded in American 
administrative law since the Administrative Procedure Act.50 Liberal 
constitutionalism provided one path to the control of bureaucratic state power, 
in part through the rule of law ideal. It was, again, aided by the “belief in a God-
given natural order,” and came to be embodied in the expectation that 
preexisting laws have “the trappings of generality and autonomy” and become 
“public and positive”:  
 
In the broadest sense, the rule of law is defined by the 
interrelated notions of neutrality, uniformity, and predictability. 
Governmental power must be exercised with the constraints or 
rules that apply to ample categories of person and acts, and 
these rules, whatever they may be, must be uniformly applied. 
Thus understood, the rule of law has nothing to do with the 
content of legal norms.51  
 
Unger argues that it proved not enough that the various groups that exist in 
liberal society live at peace that is a balance of terror; the organization of society 
must be seen as legitimate, even in the absence of the claims of naturalness that 
characterize traditional societies. This is a major challenge: a “defining attribute 
of liberal society” is “its tendency to destroy the foundations of the idea that 
what ought to be somehow inheres in what is.”52 This is true especially if 
“[e]stablished practices . . . are to be approached in the manipulative, 
instrumental fashion which the liberal style of interest association implies”53 so 
that “whatever consensus does persist in liberal society seems groundless.”54 
The “hermeneutic of suspicion,” to use Ricoeur’s term, is the lens through which 
existing inequalities and the public institutions themselves come to be seen. Our 
practices can be seen not as reflecting an implicit order in society but “as the 
products of the very forms of rankings they are used to justify.”55 In one of 
Unger’s most famous phrases, a pervasive moral skepticism produces a “sense 
of being surrounded by injustice without knowing where justice lies.”56   
The judge becomes a central figure in liberal society because it is he who 
ensures that an administrator, who deals with individuals, actually is confined 
 
 
 
law, broadly rooted in the Declaration of Independence. For an attempt to reconcile the themes, see 
HANNAH ARDENT, ON REVOLUTION 191–93 (1977) (particularly, her emphasis on the often-ignored 
words “We hold” in “We hold these truths to be self-evident. . .”). 
49 LMS, supra note 4, at 50. 
50 Id. at 163. Unger argues that “bureaucratic absolutism” came to prevail in Prussia’s version of a 
non-democratic version of a liberal society, in contrast to England’s path of parliamentary 
constitutionalism.  
51 Id. at 176. 
52 Id. at 169.  
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 170.  
55 Id. at 173.  
56 Id. at 175. 
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by the meaning of the law as determined “by a method different from the 
administrative one.”57 
 
The administrator focuses on the most effective means to realize 
given policy objectives within the constraints of the law. For 
him, rules of law are a framework within which decisions are 
made. For the judge, on the contrary, the laws pass from the 
periphery to the center of concern; they are the primary subject 
matter of his activity. Adjudication calls for distinctive sorts of 
arguments, and its integrity demands specialized institutions 
and personnel.58 
 
And so “even the narrowest view of the rule of law includes a differentiation 
of the procedures of legislation, administration, and adjudication.”59 These are 
the distinctions that turn out to be under the greatest pressure, something the 
contemporary American legal order amply demonstrates.60  
The modern rule of law seeks to achieve the impersonality of power but 
does so only partially. First, the “family, the workplace, and the market” contain 
forms of power that are not governmental, and so largely are beyond the reach 
of the rule of law.61 Second, the assumption that power exercised either by 
administrator or judge can be effectively constrained by rules it not completely 
accurate. This is, again, only a partial truth: 
 
Rules could ensure the impersonality of administrative power 
only if there were indeed a way to determine their meaning 
independently of the administrator’s preferences. Thus, the 
problem of administrative legality turns into a question of 
whether judicial power can be adequately controlled by rules. 
Can judges make use of a method that purges their decisions of 
personal whim? If we admit that words lack self-evident 
reference, that meaning must ultimately be determined by 
purpose and context, and that the intent of prior lawmakers is 
always more or less incomplete, it becomes doubtful whether a 
truly impartial method of judging could ever be fashioned 
 
 
 
57 Id. at 177. The suggestion is, in part, that an administrator’s instrumental sensibility will tend to 
push past the fair meaning of legislation toward the broader justifications for the statute in a maximizing 
manner. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF THE 
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 42–53 (1991) (providing an analysis of rule-
following that gives mandatory rules a force independent from its background justification.). 
58 Id. at 177. Unger writes that the account of the rule of law provided focuses on a narrow 
understanding rather than a more demanding version that would require lawmaking itself to follow 
procedures that all would understand it to be in their own interests, a concept underlying the Rawlsian 
veil of ignorance.  
59 Id. 
60 See Robert P. Burns, Is Our Legal Order Just Another Bureaucracy, 48 LOY. U. L. REV. 413 
(2016). 
61 LMS, supra note 4, at 180 (emphasis added). Unger’s conclusions have, of course, been under 
assault by those who contend there is a straightforward way to determine constitutional and statutory 
meaning. In my view, those attempts have achieved relatively little success. Gary Lawson, a dedicated 
formalist, finds it a bit of a scandal that there does not exist a consensus on the legitimate methods of 
statutory interpretation. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9–12 (7th ed. 2016). 
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within the conditions of liberal society. The sense of the 
precariousness of the illegitimacy of consensus makes it 
difficult for the judge to find a stable authoritative set of shared 
understandings and values upon which to base his 
interpretations of the law. Hence, every case forces him to 
decide, at least implicitly, which of the competing sets of beliefs 
in a given society should be given priority. And it requires him 
to rely on an accepted morality that, even if it can be identified, 
is increasingly revealed as the product of a social situation itself 
lacking in sanctity. To this extent, adjudication aggravates, 
rather than resolves, the problem of unjustifiable power.62 
 
Unger then provides an account of the rise and fall of rule formalism in 
Germany after 1848, an account about which this Article will say little. One set 
of conclusions, however, is relevant to this project. Both the bureaucracy and the 
judiciary could, at different times, embrace either a mechanical formalism of 
rule-following or greater discretionary power. That distinction need not provide 
the dividing line between agency and court. And specifically, the fall of 
formalism in the Weimar years “brought judges’ reasoning closer in style and 
method to the instrumental rationality of the administrative bureaucracy.”63 And 
“[t]he basic impulse of top bureaucrats remains everywhere and always the 
same: to ensure maximum leeway for their own instrumental rationality and to 
limit the discretion of other groups.”64 
England’s parliamentary constitutionalism embraced a more central role for 
the rule of law, which was “both a cause and effect of the direct participation of 
the middle classes in government.”65 But Unger draws a general conclusion from 
the German example: “The mere commitments to generality and autonomy in 
law and to the distinction among legislation, administration, and adjudication 
have no inherent democratic significance.”66 
Unger argues that within modernity, liberal societies are followed by 
postliberal societies, whose characteristics “undermine the rule of law” and 
“ultimately discourage reliance on public and positive rules as bases of social 
order.”67 Because the rule of law is “the soul of the modern state[,]” study “of 
the legal system takes us straight to the central problems faced by the society 
itself.”68 People become conscious that “society consists of a constellation of 
governments,” rather than the liberal vision of “association of individuals held 
together by a single government.”69 As the government becomes a welfare state, 
the social hierarchies that always existed under the liberal rule of law become an 
object of political debate and the state becomes involved in the “tasks of overt 
 
 
 
62 Id. 
63 LMS, supra note 4, at 189. Law-and-economics instrumentalism brings courts closer to the ideal 
of the expert agency. See Burns, supra note 60, at 425–27. 
64 LMS, supra note 4, at 190. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 191. He writes, “They can help promote an oligarchic or dictatorial monopoly of power.”  
67 Id. at 192. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 192–93.  
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redistribution, regulation, and planning.”70 The law comes to rely on “open-
ended standards and general clauses in legislation, administration, and 
adjudication” as it determines which contracts are unconscionable, what is 
unjust enrichment, what markets are competitive, and whether an agency has 
acted in the public interest.71 Similarly, legal reasoning turns: 
 
[F]rom formalistic to purposeful or policy-oriented styles of 
legal reasoning and from concerns with formal justice to an 
interest in procedural and substantive justice … An idea of 
justice is formal when it makes the uniform application of 
general rules the keystone of justice or when it establishes 
principles whose validity is supposedly independent of choices 
among conflicting values. It is procedural when it imposes 
conditions on the legitimacy of the processes by which social 
advantages are exchanged or distributed. It is substantive when 
it governs the actual outcome of distributive decisions or of 
bargains.72 
 
The ideal of formal justice assumes at least the possibility of formalistic 
legal reasoning,73 while procedural and substantive ideals envision an overt 
choice by the court among competing values.74 Postliberal societies tend to 
oscillate between relatively short periods in which formalistic, procedural, or 
substantive ideals dominate.75 The latter makes more sense as the state attempts 
to address concentrated power in the private sector and to qualify the negative 
consequences of mechanical jurisprudence. The administrative state will address 
increasingly complex issues where the helpfulness of general rules run out and 
the administrator or judge will have to individualize the meaning of broader 
principles or standards on a case by case manner.76 The explanation for these 
 
 
 
70 Id. at 193. 
71 Id. at 194.  
72 Id. Unger offers the example of contract law. Justice is formal when objective indicia of intent 
renders a contract enforceable. It is procedural when enforceability turns on equality of bargaining power. 
It is substantive when the court must determine whether the performances are of at least approximately 
equal value.  
73 See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (2002) (defending of the possibility 
of such reasoning, though Schauer concedes that he has not established that such reasoning is actually a 
fair characterization of American law).  
74 A major threat of modernity, associated most prominently with Max Weber, asserts that any such 
choice must be arbitrary. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
THEORY 47 (6th ed. 1976) (quoting MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 143 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright 
Mills eds., 1946)). 
75 Brian Tamanaha has argued that there never existed a purely formalistic understanding of legal 
discourse. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Combination of Formalism and Realism, Washington University 
in St. Louis, Research Paper No. 17-03-01, 2017). 
76 The Supreme Court approved an agency’s individualizing broad norms in a case-by-case manner, 
even where no prior general rules existed in Chenery II. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
The dissenters, including Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, thought this to be “administrative 
authoritarianism” violative of due process for an agency to proceed in much the way a common law court 
might. In another context, Justice Scalia sought to avoid the conclusion that executive administrators 
“legislate” by conceding that there is an element of law creation in the act of decision in individual cases, 
whether it occurs in what would more commonly be viewed as adjudication or not. See Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For an attempt to impose the discipline of common 
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developments is, to some extent, obscure. They involve a kind of nominalism 
about common linguistic categories and the legitimacy of existing distributions, 
leading to consequentialist evaluations of governmental activity. Unger will 
eventually say that “[t]he welfare trend in postliberal society moves the rules of 
law back in the direction of bureaucratic law.”77 
Unger’s account of the discontinuity between the implicit claim of the legal 
order to act impartially and the claim of bureaucratic law to act in the public 
interest and the underlying multiplicity of interests in many ways parallels 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of the inevitably strained and unprincipled 
policies in any modern state. MacIntyre is notoriously unenthusiastic about 
modern pluralism. The notion that “political authority is justified in so far as it 
provides a secure social order within which individuals may pursue their own 
particular ends, whatever they are[,]” a “conception at once individualist and 
minimalist,” is dangerous, because it will be rational to be a free rider and 
because this kind of society may not “provide adequate justification for the kind 
of allegiance that a political society must have from its members, if it is to 
flourish.”78 He ends his account in After Virtue with a stark dichotomy between 
a traditional society structured by Aristotelian internal norms or one ruled solely 
by the will to power. In other essays, he has argued that our society is in essence 
the latter and that Aristotelian principles are unavailable to us.79 
MacIntyre is impressed as well by the “exceptional degree of 
compartmentalization” imposed by the structure of advanced Western 
countries.80 One consequence is that “norms governing activities in any one area 
are specific to that area.”81 Thus a “[c]ompartmentalized society imposes a 
fragmented ethics.”82 His broader view of modern societies draws out the 
consequences for the character of politics of Unger’s agonistic view of politics: 
 
Modern states retain the allegiance of those heterogeneous, 
overlapping and sometimes competing social groups to which 
 
 
 
law courts on at least formal agency adjudication, see LeMoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004).  
77 LMS, supra note 4, at 238.  
78 ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good, in THE MACINTYRE 
READER, 235–52, (Kelvin Knight ed., 1998).  
79 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Theories of Natural Law in the Culture of Advanced Modernity, in 
COMMON TRUTHS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL LAW 91–115 (Edward B. McLean ed., 2000). 
MacIntyre argues that on a Thomistic view “all positive law that conforms to what reason requires by 
way of justice – and only laws that conform to reason and justice” are true law and that all plain persons 
are in agreement as to the fundamental of law and morals. But no fact seems plainer in the modern world 
than the extent and depth of moral disagreement, often enough disagreement on basic issues … [W]e 
should not expect those older conceptions of natural law to continue to flourish in the modern world. And 
they do not. What we find instead, for the most part, are very different theories of natural law, theories 
that have come to terms in greater or less degree with cultural modernity. 
Contemporary forms of natural law, Moore’s or Weinreb’s for example, deprive appeals to natural 
law of what was two central features, features that gave such appeals their distinctive point and purpose. 
What the natural law was held to provide was a shared and public standard by appeal to which the claims 
of particular systems of positive law to the allegiance could be evaluated. But a shared and public 
standard, of this kind, must be one that is able to secure widespread, if not universal rational assent. 
Contemporary forms of natural law do not achieve that kind of assent.  
80 MACINTYRE, supra note 78, at 235.  
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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their subjects belong by negotiating temporary settlements with 
those groups … [They] have to adopt a range of varying and 
sometimes incompatible stances, appealing to different and 
sometimes incompatible values, here giving market 
considerations an overriding value, there denying them this 
weight, here accepting governmental responsibility for this or 
that aspect of social life, there disowning it, here expressing 
respect for custom and tradition, there flouting them in the name 
of modernization…A willingness to break promises and to shift 
positions has become, not a liability, but one aspect of what in 
the social life of modernity is accounted the chief of virtues, 
adaptability.83 
 
Political outcomes are “determined by shifting coalitions of interest and 
power with the limits set by and for those elites who determine—although not 
at all at will—the range of choices confronting governments.”84 There are few 
forums in which “substantive issues concerning ways of life” can be debated in 
any sustained and serious ways.85 Though, the apparently neutral determinations 
of liberal government “undermine some [forums] and promote others.”86 
MacIntyre thus concludes that “local arenas are now the only places where 
political community can be constructed, a political community very much at 
odds with the politics of the nation-state.”87 
The autonomy and generality ideals become implausible to the extent that 
the range of relevant facts, facts reflecting “numerous and inchoate interests,” is 
understood to increase.88 The system faces a Hobson’s choice between an 
intuitively attractive flexibility and discretion in applying general standards or 
an unattractive “petrification” that reduces standards to rules.89 Purposive legal 
reasoning introduces flexibility based on variations in the factual context and the 
instrumental means concretely available to achieve the law’s perceived purpose. 
“Hence, the very notion of stable areas of individual entitlement and obligation, 
a notion inseparable from the rule of law ideal, will be eroded.”90 The attempt to 
achieve a refined substantive justice, for example, by expanding the range of 
excuses available to a criminal defendant based on “judgments about particular 
persons and individual situations,” also will “resist statement as rules.”91 The 
 
 
 
83 Id. at 245.  
84 Id. This view is consistent with his general view that modern Western societies “are oligarchies 
disguised as liberal democracies” where the “large majority of those who inhabit them are excluded from 
membership in the elites that determine the range of alternatives between which voters are permitted to 
choose.” 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 238.  
87 Id. at 248.  
88 Id. 
89 See HANNAH ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 302 (1973) (“No doubt, whenever public 
life and its law of equality are completely victorious, where a civilization succeeds in eliminating or 
reducing to a minimum the dark background of difference, it will end in complete petrification and be 
punished, so to speak, for having forgotten that man is only the master, not the creator of the world.”).   
90 LMS, supra note 4, at 198. 
91 Id. at 199. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 139–41 
(2011). Stuntz celebrates the vagueness of the legal standards applied by juries in the early twentieth 
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autonomy of the rule of law ideal is likewise eroded by broader standards that 
invite invocation of “the technician’s conception of efficiency or the lawman’s 
view of justice” and so legal discourse “approaches that of common place 
political or economic argument” which is “characterized by the predominance 
of instrumental rationality over other modes of thought.”92 “Courts begin to 
resemble openly first administrative, then other political institutions” which, in 
turn, erodes the difference between lawyers and other bureaucrats or 
technicians.”93 All these developments contribute to reducing the appeal of the 
distinctive ideals of generality and autonomy in the law.  
The rise of the corporate state also serves to qualify the ideals of the rule of 
law by effacing the boundaries between “state and society, and therefore 
between the public and the private realm.”94 Administrative, corporate, and labor 
law “merge into a body of social law that is more applicable to the structure of 
private-public organizations than to official conduct or private transactions.”95 
Private organizations themselves become more bureaucratized to achieve the 
power that bureaucratization confers and allows them to exercise sometimes 
“decisive influence over government agencies.”96 And the concrete “[l]aw of 
institutions is a law compounded of state-authored rules and of privately-
sponsored regulations or practices; its two elements are less and less capable of 
being separated.”97 Unger concludes in the speculative hope that the corporatist 
and communitarian themes in post-liberalism undermine bureaucratic law and 
open the “way for the return to the custom of each group as the fundamental and 
almost exclusive instrument of social order.”98 
Central to legal modernity, then, is a development away from formalism99 
and toward other doctrines more responsive to the ideals of equity and solidarity, 
notions the formalist distrusts because liberalism assumes that “all moral 
judgments are subjective even if they are widely shared.”100 Purposive legal 
interpretation creates an unstable compromise, resolving none of the underlying 
 
 
 
century. See also CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 704–07 (2007). Taylor offers an account of why 
any normative view cannot be reduced to rules.  
92 LMS, supra note 4, at 199. The threatened dominance of instrumental rationality over all other 
modes of thought in modern society is a central theme of both Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor, 
though Taylor seems to accept a greater modus vivendi with objectivizing and instrumental modes of 
thought as elements of the modern identity. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 499–502. MacIntyre is distressed 
that there exist no common measures to evaluate the relative importance of competing values in modern 
society. 
93 LMS, supra note 4, at 200.  
94 Id. at 201. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 202. See also ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION 46 (1971) (articulating that the fear 
of “capture” of agencies by regulated parties has been, of course, one of the driving forces in American 
administrative law). 
97 LMS, supra note 4, at 202.  
98 Id. at 238. 
99 Id. at 204 (“A system of rules is formal insofar as it allows its official or nonofficial interpreters to 
justify their decisions by reference to the rules themselves and to the presence or absence of facts stated 
by the rules, without regard to any other arguments of fairness of utility.”). He concedes that formalism 
is a matter of degree. Cf. SCHAUER, supra note 57, at 93–100 (making an account similar to Unger’s, 
though emphasizing the contrast between justification by appeal to rules, not to broader notions of fairness 
or utility, but rather than to the purposes the rules themselves were designed to achieve). See also LMS, 
supra note 4, at 204. 
100 LMS, supra note 4, at 205. 
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issues. Unger seems to suggest that the tension between formalism and equity 
reflect ever-present conflicts within legal traditions, rather than as one specific 
to modernity. Unger’s view of procedural justice is largely Weberian, where 
that form of justice is an attempt to qualify the results of naked arms-length 
bargaining or power politics by strengthening one of the participants, leading to 
distributive consequences, though without directly mandating substantively just 
outcomes.101 Unger also provides a list of the ways in which basically formal 
legal systems may at least nod in the direction of broader moral or political goals. 
In particular, “technical legal doctrines developed and applied thought 
adjudication”102 probably under the equal protection clause, may have a limited 
role in recognizing “both comparative fault and relative need”103 and attacking 
the “problem of domination at its core.”104 They implicitly reject modern notions 
of the subjectivity of value and “insist on judging the moral quality of social 
relations.”105 The continuing appeal of hard law under modern conditions stems 
from both unavoidable free-rider problems and a deeper reason: “[i]n modern 
society, in which much of religion and morals are seen as prerogatives of 
individuals’ conscience, law is the preeminently collective order,” one that can 
respect the authority of moral standards over concrete social life.106 Conceding 
the Hegelian point that there cannot be too great a discontinuity (though it is 
healthy that there be some), between the “modes and motives of ordinary 
conduct” and public law, Unger urges that the tension be thought of as within 
public law, not in the typically modern imaginary of discontinuity between 
private morality and the norms applicable to public institutions.107 Unger then 
tells the dark story of the death of formality in Weimar Germany and the “high 
risks critical intelligence runs when it attacks the idea of positive law on behalf 
of an ideal of self-governing community.”108 
There exist, then, a number of questions about the way forward for a modern 
postliberal order: 
 
Do these events suggest a return to the near exclusive primacy 
of custom? Or do they point the way to a novel kind of 
normative order? Do they irremediably compromise 
liberalism’s cherished ideals of freedom and of the capacity to 
distinguish critically between what ought to be and what is? Or 
do they accommodate these ideals with a broader vision that 
also embodies the claims of community and of the sense of 
 
 
 
101 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 47 (elaborating that consistent with his value skepticism, Weber 
tends to regard all procedures only in light of their distributive consequences). 
102 LMS, supra note 4, at 212. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 213. Unger wrote these words in 1976. His hopes on this score have not been realized in the 
United States. As he feared, such legal theories have remained “isolated in a politically inhospitable 
atmosphere.”  
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 215–16.  
108 Id. at 220. His reflections are consistent with what can only be called Arendt’s reverence for the 
rigidity of law, something that places “hedges” between persons that make public freedom possible. As 
Unger puts it, in Germany “[t]he ideology of corporativist union became a pretext for unchecked 
bureaucratic dictatorship.”  
 
 
  
 
 
 
322 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. vol. 10:2 
participation in a natural order permeating society and the entire 
world?109 
 
Unger envisions two broad possibilities. The first is a kind of contraction of 
the historical development he described, in which the rule of law ideal, closely 
allied with the notion of individual freedom, and bureaucratic law, associated 
with the notion that social arrangements can be understood and changed, both 
recede. The former development may threaten individual freedom and may 
portend a kind of conservative or tribal fatalism. The other possibility is more 
hopeful, perhaps utopian, and envisions an upward spiral in which a higher 
reconciliation of conflicting perspectives can take place. Freedom is reconciled 
with community, on the one hand, and an understanding that we create our social 
world110 is “reconciled with the sense of an immanent order in society.”111 
Moving beyond bureaucratic law and the rule of law ideal could occur only after 
a number of unlikely developments: a lessening of inequality which would be 
the social precondition for an emerging consensus on matters of justice that is 
reliably perceived as reflecting a “moral foundation” that is not an ideological 
expression of dominant groups. Even such a consensus would have to retain the 
openness to the future through its own continual revision through “the 
conflictual process by which communities are created over time.”112  
 
Such a reconciliation of immanent order and transcendent 
criticism would imply a greater replacement than we could now 
comprehend of bureaucratic law or the rule of law by what in a 
sense could be called ‘custom.’ This customary law would have 
many of the marks we associate with custom: its lack of a 
positive and a public character and its largely emergent and 
implicit quality. Yet it would differ from custom in making 
room for a distinction between what is and what ought to be. It 
would become less the stable normative order of a particular 
group than the developing moral language of mankind.113 
 
Currently, in post-liberal society, the three kinds of law all exist and 
interpenetrate each other. There exists (1) a sphere of blackletter law where the 
distinctive conventions of the legal profession dominate, (2) a sphere of 
bureaucratic law114 where an administrative elite employs what may fairly be 
called policy sciences, and (3) a background that reflects “the inchoate sense of 
equity and solidarity.”115 The last, he tells us, in a less unequal society, could be 
“the primitive form taken by “the struggle to discover a universal given order in 
 
 
 
109 Id. at 221. 
110 See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 51–92 (1994).  
111 LMS, supra note 4, at 239. 
112 Id. at 241. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. These spheres do not neatly align with the institutional division between courts and agencies. 
Courts can employ instrumental methods and agencies aspire to more traditional adjudication.  
115 Id. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
2020 MODERNITY AND THE LAW 323 
 
social life.”116 In a manner reminiscent of Fuller, he tells us that this is the natural 
home of the lawyer: 
 
The search for this latent and living law–not the law of 
prescriptive rules or of bureaucratic policies, but the elementary 
code of human interaction–has been the staple of the lawyer’s 
art wherever this art was practiced with the most depth and skill. 
What united the great Islamic ‘ulama’, the Roman jurisconsults, 
and the English common lawyers was the sense they shared that 
the law, rather than being made chiefly by judges and princes, 
was already present in society itself. Throughout history there 
has been a bond between the legal profession and the search for 
an order inherent in social life. The existence of this bond 
suggests that the lawyer’s insight, which preceded the advent of 
the legal order, can survive its decline.117 
 
Note that his examples are largely pre-modern, but he is describing here a 
future that would occur after modernity’s destructive effects on the rule of law 
ideal. And so, this has to be speculation, a projection of perceived trends. It may 
turn out that the future remains like the present, a directionless tension among 
the legal order, bureaucratic law and custom. 
Unger ends by returning to issues of social theory. The “problems of 
method, order, and modernity are closely connected.”118 He calls for an 
interpretive social science that explains by placing elements of social life within 
the meaningful wholes that confer significance to the “logic of situations.”119 He 
argues that this is the most appropriate method for the study of law, because “[a] 
society’s law constitutes the chief bond between its culture and its organization; 
it is the external manifestation of the embeddedness of the former in the 
latter.”120 It treads a middle path between behaviorism and idealism. It yields a 
view that attempts to synthesize “the doctrine of private interest and consensus, 
and hence between the instrumental and non-instrumental view of rules.”121  
(The latter focuses on their legitimacy.) The natural home of the latter is 
customary law; its theoretical and practical limitation is addressing conflict and 
change, where they inevitably occur. 
 
The doctrine of private interest is most applicable to liberal 
society, and more generally, to those aspects of modernity 
characterized by the antagonism of individual ends and the felt 
 
 
 
116 Id. at 242. 
117 Id. Recall that by “the legal order,” Unger means only the modern rule of law ideal.  
118 Id. at 243.  
119 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 60 (1960). This recalls 
at a theoretical level the “situation sense” that the Realists claimed to guide lawyers and judges in making 
concrete decisions. See generally HANNA PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 241–86 (1972) (providing 
an insightful treatment of the issues surrounding the connection of interpretive to causal explanation). 
120 LMS, supra note 4, at 250–51. This is most obvious in customary law where we find “tacit 
standards of right that are actual patterns of conduct” that “stamp a meaning on every act committed in 
obedience to them or in violation of them.” 
121 Id. at 262. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
324 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. vol. 10:2 
illegitimacy of consensus. The social situation it portrays are 
those that serve as the settings for an imposed bureaucratic law 
or for an allegedly impartial legal order.122 
 
The theories justifying liberalism have difficulty accounting for social 
stability and cohesion and liberal societies experience their arrangements as 
fragile and sometimes illegitimate. Liberalism is thus “the form of social life that 
most depends on impersonal rules, yet it is the one least able to shape and apply 
them.”123 When consensus fails, both bureaucratic law and the legal order lack 
the resources to address the crisis. That is because both individuality and 
sociability of persons are basic attributes of persons that cannot completely be 
suppressed. What is the utopian solution? “A society resolves the crisis of order 
insofar as it manages to reconcile individual freedom with community cohesion, 
and the sense of an immanent order with the possibility of transcendent 
criticism.”124    
He rejects the account of modernity offered by liberalism, that of “an 
association of individuals who have conflicting ends and whose security and 
freedom are guaranteed by the rule of law”125 and the competing Marxist account 
of class struggle masked by ideology and false consciousness. Liberal modern 
society denies “both community and immanent order and is therefore best 
described by the doctrine of private interest.”126 Post-liberal modern society, 
embodied in the welfare state, is “obsessed … with the reconciliation of freedom 
and community.”127  
 
This alliance is part of a broader responsibility; the sense of a 
latent natural order in social life must be harmonized with the 
capacity to let the will remake social arrangements. To achieve 
this reconciliation, and thereby to work toward the ideal of a 
universal community, is the great political task of modern 
societies.128 
 
Unger ends with a respectful acknowledgement that the great modern social 
theorists’ assault on metaphysics, with its speculative illusions, and politics, with 
the variation of political judgment, was partially successful. Now, however, the 
task is to travel back in the opposite direction: social theory must become both 
metaphysical and political. Metaphysical, because to solve its own problems, it 
must embrace understandings of knowledge and human nature of which a 
rigorously scientific account will never give. He concedes that we do not have 
 
 
 
122 Id. at 263. 
123 Id. at 264. 
124 Id. See generally JAMES HOOPES, COMMUNITY DENIED: THE WRONG TURN OF PRAGMATIC 
LIBERALISM (1998) (forgiving an account, based on Peirce’s philosophy, one that is friendly to modern 
science and is both epistemologically realist and defeasible).  
125 Id. at 266. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
128 Id.  
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such a metaphysics.129 Political, because there is inevitably a dialectic between 
political events and our social understanding, and description can never be fully 
separated from evaluation. We do not yet have such a politics. As Clifford Geertz 
put it with regard to explanation: insight comes from a “continuous dialectical 
tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global of global 
structures in such a way as to bring them both into view simultaneously.”130 
Unger puts it this way: “For surely it is true of social theory as of other branches 
of knowledge that the deepest insight is likely to be gained when one is in 
passage from a more general to a more particular perception, or from the 
particular to the general.”131  
Unger has set out a global account of modern law and linked the most 
dramatic features of contemporary law to the social background and to the 
intertwined philosophical issues. He demonstrates the appeal of legal formalism 
in a liberal, interest group world, the pervasive limitations of its claim to 
autonomy from the underlying political conflicts, and the dangers inherent in its 
decline. He shows how the second coming of bureaucratic law132 is rooted in the 
limitations of formalism. Finally, Unger provides a picture of modernity 
characterized by a pervasive belief in the subjectivity of value intertwined with 
a pluralism of social groups and interests. He ends with an argument that only a 
transformed politics and a not yet existent metaphysics would provide the way 
forward. 
 
 
 
129 Id. at 261 (His “conception of the relationship between human nature and history could be fully 
worked out only with the help of a metaphysics we do not yet possess.”). 
130 Clifford Geertz, “From the Native’s Point of View”: On the Nature of Anthropological 
Understanding, 28 BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 26, 43 (1974). 
131 LMS, supra note 4, at 267–68.  
132 See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1249 
(1994). 
